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(11) 
DON’T PRESS SEND: COMMONWEALTH V. DIEGO TAKES 
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AWAY FROM TEXTERS 
MARC B. ROBERTSON* 
“[W]e as human beings, even those of us who in words disclaim the 
importance of our own privacy, instinctively understand the profound 
importance of it.”1 
I. YOU HAVE ONE NEW MESSAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PENNSYLVANIA SUPERIOR COURT’S MESSAGE THAT TEXTS ARE 
NOT PRIVATE 
As presidential candidates Rand Paul and Chris Christie stood on the 
debate stage, they sparred over one of the most pressing and contentious matters 
facing the United States today: the government’s invasion of individuals’ 
privacy rights.2  Christie, a former United States Attorney and strong supporter 
of law enforcement, argued for continuing the use of mass surveillance in an 
effort to prevent terrorist attacks.3  Paul, a libertarian and staunch opponent of 
government surveillance, provided a familiar retort to each of Christie’s 
comments: “Get a warrant!”4  The issue these two men were debating was 
whether the warnings from George Orwell’s dystopian commentary 1984 were 
coming true: “There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being 
watched at any given moment. . . .  You had to live—did live, from habit that 
became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, 
and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.”5 
 
*   J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A. 
2012, Villanova University.  I would like to thank my family and friends who continue to 
support me throughout all my endeavors.  I am especially grateful to those who provided 
feedback and input in writing this Note.  I would also like to thank the Villanova Law Review 
and everyone whose work went into publication of this Note. 
1.  Glenn Greenwald, Why Privacy Matters, TED TALKS (Oct. 7, 2014), transcript 
available at 
www.ted.com/talks/glenn_greenwald_why_privacy_matters/transcript?language=en 
[https://perma.cc/UY3W-F5FM] (discussing concerns over privacy issues in wake of Edward 
Snowden revealing details about government’s mass surveillance programs). 
2.  See Transcript: Read the Full Text of the Primetime Republican Debate, TIME (Aug. 
6, 2015), http://time.com/3988276/republican-debate-primetime-transcript-full-text/ 
[https://perma.cc/DV85-YNS5] (updated Aug. 11, 2015, 4:30 PM) (responding to question 
regarding government surveillance). 
3.  See id. 
4.  See id. 
5.  See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 3 (1st Signet Classic reprt. 1961) (1949).  See 
generally, Greenwald, supra note 1 (referencing George Orwell’s discussion of surveillance 
activities of Big Brother in novel 1984).  In his recent TED Talk, Mr. Greenwald addresses 
the issue of privacy in the wake of revelations by Edward Snowden that the American 
government was involved in “indiscriminate surveillance.”  See id.  Early in the lecture, he 
addresses the argument made by many in support of this surveillance that “no real harm [] 
comes from this large-scale invasion because only people who are engaged in bad acts have a 
reason to want to hide and to care about their privacy.”  See id.  Greenwald, however, rebukes 
1
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While terrorist attacks and mass indiscriminate surveillance are more 
extreme circumstances than those at issue in Commonwealth v. Diego,6 the 
superior court decision could have far-reaching and potentially grave 
ramifications on privacy in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.7  In Diego, 
Curtis Doval Diego set up a drug transaction via text message with a police 
informant.8  After his arrest, Diego argued he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the text messages sent to the informant and that the police violated 
the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (the Pennsylvania 
Wiretap Act) by “intercept[ing]” his text messages without first obtaining a 
warrant.9  Upon review of the trial court decision to suppress the evidence, the 
superior court found Diego lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
text messages he sent.10  Because of this, there was no “interception” of those 
messages as the informant voluntarily turned them over to law enforcement.11 
This Note argues that Pennsylvania courts ought to recognize a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in text messages.12  Further, the Pennsylvania legislature 
should amend the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act to address the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court’s decision in Diego and require law enforcement to obtain a 
warrant before obtaining an individual’s text messages, even if the recipient of 
those messages relays them to the police.13  Part II provides a background of 
privacy issues in the United States.14  Next, Part III sets out the facts and 
procedure of Diego.15  Part IV then analyzes the superior court’s reasoning.16  
 
this notion, stating that although there are people who claim to not care about privacy, no one 
truly feels this way.  See id.  He says that all human beings “instinctively understand the 
profound importance of [privacy].”  Id.  Greenwald believes that all humans “crave[]” privacy 
and notes that many psychological studies have found that when people believe they are being 
watched, they change their behavior “dramatically.”  See id.  He notes that government access 
to items humans believe should be private harms society as a whole.  See id.  This issue is 
extremely important to humans because, 
[I]t is a realm of privacy, the ability to go somewhere where we can think and 
reason and interact and speak without the judgmental eyes of others being cast upon 
us, in which creativity and exploration and dissent exclusively reside, and that is the 
reason why, when we allow a society to exist in which we’re subject to constant 
monitoring, we allow the essence of human freedom to be severely crippled. 
Id. 
6.  119 A.3d 370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015), appeal denied, 129 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2015) 
(mem.) (unpublished table decision). 
7.  For a thorough discussion of the impact of the Diego decision, see infra notes 126–
58 and accompanying text. 
8.  See Diego, 119 A.3d at 372–73 (discussing police use of informant to set up drug 
transaction). 
9.  See id. 
10.  See id. at 372 (reversing suppression order).  
11.  See id. at 382 (holding that trial court decision should be overturned). 
12.  For a further discussion of the need for courts to find a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in text messages, see infra notes 133–47 and accompanying text. 
13.  See Diego at 380–81 (finding no interception occurs in violation of Pennsylvania 
Wiretap Act when informant “voluntarily” relays text messages to law enforcement officer). 
14.  For a further discussion of privacy issues, see infra notes 18–78 and accompanying 
text. 
15.  For a further discussion of the facts, procedural history, and holding in Diego, see 
infra notes 79–125 and accompanying text. 
16.  For a further discussion of the need for a broader expectation of privacy and 
2
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Part V concludes by arguing for a broader expectation of privacy in sent text 
messages and asserting the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act should be amended to 
close the loophole that allows law enforcement officers to obtain text messages 
from an informant without obtaining a warrant.17 
II. FROM PAGERS TO FLIP PHONES TO SMART PHONES: A 
BACKGROUND OF LEGAL DECISIONS REGARDING PRIVACY IN 
TECHNOLOGY 
As technological developments have led to new and different varieties of 
communication, courts have been faced with the issue of deciding what is 
private and what is not.18  These cases typically involve the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and address the issue of whether law 
enforcement must obtain a warrant before searching one’s property.19  As 
technology has advanced, state surveillance statutes such as the Pennsylvania 
Wiretap Act have come under review, and courts have had to balance privacy 
issues against the ability of law enforcement to fight crime.20  While the law is 
 
legislation to protect that privacy, see infra notes 126–58 and accompanying text. 
17.  For a discussion of how Diego may affect privacy rights in the future, see infra 
notes 159–63 and accompanying text. 
18.  See City of Ontario, v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (“The judiciary risks error 
by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology 
before its role in society has become clear.”); see also Joseph C. Vitale, Note, Text Me 
Maybe?: State v. Hinton and the Possibility of Fourth Amendment Protections over Sent Text 
Messages Stored in Another’s Cell Phone, 58 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1109, 1110 (2014) (explaining 
that recent Supreme Court decisions on this issue have given broad deference to lower courts 
to decide cell phone privacy issues).  For a detailed account of the development of cell phones 
and text messaging technology, see Vitale, supra, at 1112–18 (detailing cell phone use around 
world).  Vitale notes that cell phones are “one of the most rapidly growing new technologies 
in the world.”  Id. at 1112 (quoting Mikiyasu Hakoama & Shotaro Hakoyama, The Impact of 
Cell Phone Use on Social Networking and Development Among College Students, 15 AM. 
ASS’N BEHAV. & SOC. SCI. J., Spring 2011, at 1, 2) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Because cell phones are widely used, people have grown attached to their cell phones.  See id. 
at 1113–14.  Due to this attachment, studies have found that most people consider the 
information stored on their cell phones to be private.  See id.  Vitale also provides several 
interesting statistics regarding cell phone privacy, including, 
[s]eventy-eight percent of Americans consider the information on their cell phones 
to be “at least as private as that on their home computers.”  Furthermore, nearly 
20% of Americans think their cell phones hold more private information than do 
their computers.  Seventy-six percent of Americans think that law enforcement 
officers should need permission from a court before searching the cell phone of “a 
person arrested on suspicion of committing a crime, if the person does not consent 
to having the phone searched.” 
Id. at 1114 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Jennifer M. Urban, Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Su Li, 
Mobile Phones and Privacy 2 (UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2103405, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103405)).  Vitale further discusses the history of text 
messages and writes that today, text messaging (in addition to taking photos) is the most 
commonly used function of cell phone owners.  See id. at 1116–17.  These statistics indicate 
that courts will need to address the issue of privacy in text messaging, as it is now so 
widespread.  See id. 1112–18. 
19.  For a discussion of the Fourth Amendment and the use of warrants, see infra notes 
23–28 and accompanying text. 
20.  For a thorough discussion of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, see infra notes 29–37 
3
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unsettled regarding an expectation of privacy when sending a text message, a 
growing trend signals greater privacy rights in the future.21  The Pennsylvania 
legislature must recognize these privacy rights and will need to address 
loopholes like those in the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, which allow police 
officers to access text messages relayed by informants without obtaining a 
warrant.22 
A. Passcode Required: The Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s 
View of a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
In order to search and seize an object or document, law enforcement must 
abide by the Fourth Amendment, which typically involves obtaining a 
warrant.23  There are situations, however, where a warrantless search may be 
 
and accompanying text.  
21.  See, e.g., Quon, 560 U.S. at 760 (discussing pervasiveness of cell phones).  The 
Court in Quon considered that because cell phones and text messages were so widely used, 
this may “strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy.”  See id.  While the Court 
considered that Quon may have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages, 
because the City owned the device, and because of the “‘special needs’ of the workplace,” it 
was appropriate for the police department to require access to the messages in certain 
situations.  See id. at 760–61; see also State v. Hinton, 319 P.3d 9, 15 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) 
(holding that individual who shares information with another party does not lose expectation 
of privacy); John Soma, Melodi Mosley Gates & Michael Smith, Bit-Wise but Privacy 
Foolish: Smarter E-Messaging Technologies Call for a Return to Core Privacy Principles, 20 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 487, 503–04 (2010) (discussing society’s views on e-messaging 
technologies and privacy interests).  In discussing trends in technology and privacy, the 
authors argue that users  
base[] [their] expectation of privacy on how [they] use[] the technology, such as to 
carry on a conversation, rather than on the specific technical means used.  This 
functional view by users lends credence to the idea that society should—and likely 
will—recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy for e-messaging.   
Id. at 504. 
22.  See Soma et al., supra note 21, at 518 (“Uncertainty in the law leaves e-messaging 
users . . . without clear guidance . . . .”).  Soma, Gates, and Smith note that courts have shown 
willingness to “a privacy principle-based approach . . . regarding text messages,” but the law 
regarding this privacy is very unclear.  See id. at 517–18; see also Lathrop B. Nelson, III, 
Don’t Text with an Informant and iPads Are Not Phones, WHITE COLLAR ALERT (June 25, 
2015), http://whitecollarblog.mmwr.com/tag/commonwealth-v-diego/ 
[https://perma.cc/U5K5-CYZU] (reviewing Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in Diego).  
Nelson argues that Diego will force citizens to be “vigilant” to avoid government 
overreaching, rather than requiring the government to uphold its constitutional obligations.  
See id. 
23.  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Id.; see also Vitale, supra note 18, at 1118–19 & n.60 (discussing search and seizure 
requirements under Fourth Amendment).  In analyzing cell phone privacy, many courts 
analogize cell phones to “wallets, address books, and diaries.”  See id. at 1122.  Because cell 
phones have address books, and because police are “entitled to open a pocket diary to copy 
the owner’s address,” some courts have found that police should be entitled to “turn on a cell 
4
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reasonable.24  If a government official or law enforcement officer violates the 
Fourth Amendment and performs an illegal search and seizure, the defendant 
can, under certain circumstances, have that evidence suppressed.25  In 
addressing whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in text 
messages, many courts have looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. 
United States.26  In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan laid out a test for 
determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
which has been frequently invoked in subsequent court decisions.27  Justice 
Harlan’s two part test requires “first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”28 
 
phone to learn its number.”  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, courts have 
begun to recognize a distinction between a cell phone number and the “highly private” 
information that can be found on a modern cell phone.  See id. 
24.  See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5704(2)(ii) (2015) (noting exception to warrant 
requirement of Pennsylvania Wiretap Act when one party gives consent prior to interception); 
see also Vitale, supra note 18, at 1118-19 (discussing that there are “various exceptions” to 
warrant requirement of Fourth Amendment). 
25.  See Vitale, supra note 18, at 1118–19 (discussing exclusionary rule).  Not only is 
illegally-obtained evidence suppressed in such situations, any evidence that was “[the] 
exploitation of that illegality” is also suppressed.  Id. at 1119 n.65 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (discussing “fruit of the 
poisonous tree” doctrine)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
26.  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
27.  See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (introducing test for reasonable expectation 
of privacy). 
28.  See id. (creating test for reasonable expectation of privacy).  It is important to note 
that there are some exceptions to the Katz test.  These include what a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, the “misplaced trust doctrine,” when a person sends a letter, and exigent 
circumstances.  See Vitale, supra, note 18, at 1120 (discussing exceptions to Katz test 
whereby one has no reasonable expectation of privacy).  Under the misplaced trust doctrine, 
“people place their trust in others at their own peril and must assume the risk of [that] 
betrayal.”  Id. at 1120 (alteration in original) (quoting DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. 
SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 82, 107 (3d ed. 2011)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Further, when a person knowingly exposes information to the 
public, that information is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.  See id.  Among the 
examples of public disclosure that forecloses Fourth Amendment protection, courts have 
decided that when a person sends a letter, there is no expectation of privacy in the contents 
once the intended party receives it.  See id. at 1140–41 (discussing letter doctrine).  Finally, in 
exigent circumstances, warrantless searches may be lawful if the need for law enforcement is 
greater than the privacy interests.  See id. at 1120–21.  These include “life-threatening 
exigencies, hot pursuit, and preservation of evidence from destruction.”  Id. at 1121 (quoting 
Clifford S. Fishman, Interception of Communications in Exigent Circumstances: The Fourth 
Amendment, Federal Legislation, and the United States Department of Justice, 22 GA. L. 
REV. 1, 13 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Often, courts have allowed for 
warrantless searches of cell phones in an effort to preserve evidence.  See id. at 1121–22.  
However, some courts—notably the Ohio Supreme Court—have rejected this rationale, 
claiming that service providers may maintain cell phone records and law enforcement may be 
able to obtain a warrant to search those records.  See id. 
5
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B. Mark as Read: Overview of Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and 
Electronic Surveillance Control Act 
The Pennsylvania Wiretap Act is a state statute that seeks to protect 
citizens from illegal wiretaps that violate the Fourth Amendment.29  While 
states have the freedom to adopt their own legislation, they must do so in 
accordance with federal law and provide at least the same amount of protection 
as the federal law.30  Under the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, it is illegal to 
intentionally “intercept[] . . . disclose[] . . . or . . . use[] the contents of any wire, 
electronic or oral communication . . . .”31  Pennsylvania courts have consistently 
held that the purpose of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act is to ensure the 
protection of privacy, and therefore courts have strictly construed the provisions 
of the Act.32 
Generally, a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy during an oral 
conversation, but there has been disagreement over whether one has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in other forms of communication, such as 
emails.33  Another source of confusion often occurs when courts attempt to 
 
29.  See 18 PA. CONST. STAT. §§ 5701–5782 (1978); see also Commonwealth v. Deck, 
954 A.2d 603, 607–10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (discussing purpose of Pennsylvania Wiretap 
Act).  In reviewing the statute, the court instructed, “[The Pennsylvania] Wiretap Act is 
modeled on Title III (‘Title III’) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968” 
which “authorizes states to adopt wiretap statutes that trigger greater, but not lesser, protection 
than that available under federal law.”  Id. at 607.  Further, the court instructed that the 
provisions of the statute must be “construed strictly” in an effort to protect privacy interests.  
See id. 
30.  See Commonwealth v. Birdseye, 670 A.2d 1124, 1126 (Pa. 1996) (“By virtue of the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, Section 2, the Federal Act 
preempts the ability of the states to adopt legislation that would be less restrictive in allowing 
interceptions.”), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1019 (1996). 
31.  See 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5703; cf. Wiretap Act, LAWYERS.COM, 
http://communications-media.lawyers.com/privacy-law/wiretapping.html 
[https://perma.cc/EL3J-N67M] (last visited Mar. 28, 2016) (providing detailed summary and 
legal consequences of federal Wiretap Act). 
32.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spangler, 809 A.2d 234, 237 (Pa. 2002) (citing 
Commonwealth v. De Marco, 578 A.2d 942, 949 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)) (discussing hesitation 
to broaden exceptions found under Pennsylvania Wiretap Act).  In addressing the issue before 
it, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on other cases in ensuring that the Pennsylvania 
Wiretap Act emphasizes the protection of privacy.  See id. 
33.  See Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) 
(discussing expectation of privacy on internet), appeal granted in part by 790 A.2d 988 (Pa. 
2002) (mem.), and order aff’d by 837 A.2d 1163 (Pa. 2003) (mem.).  The court said, 
While engaging in a conversation over the telephone, a party would have no reason 
to believe that the other party was taping the conversation.  Any reasonably 
intelligent person, savvy enough to be using the Internet, however, would be aware 
of the fact that messages are received in a recorded format, by their very nature, and 
can be downloaded or printed by the party receiving the message.  By the very act 
of sending a communication over the Internet, the party expressly consents to the 
recording of the message. 
Id.  In further discussing this issue, the Proetto court held that conversations on the Internet, 
similar to messages left on an answering machine, indicate mutual consent of the parties to 
recording.  See id. at 830 (citing Commonwealth v. De Marco, 578 A.2d 942 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1990); see also Judge Jessica Brewbaker, What are Pennsylvania’s wiretapping laws? The 
6
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determine whether a possible interception falls under the various exceptions 
noted in the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.34  For example, exceptions to the 
general requirement to obtain a warrant include when a police officer interacts 
directly with a suspected criminal or if one party to the conversation consents to 
an interception.35  An even greater source of confusion arises when a police 
officer is not directly involved in the conversation.36  Pennsylvania courts must 
resolve the confusion stemming from the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act by 
balancing law enforcement and privacy interests.37 
C. Storage Almost Full: Courts Slow to Find Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy in Text Messages 
In reviewing the Fourth Amendment regarding technology, courts have 
historically been reluctant to find a blanket right to privacy in information.38  
Often, the government will rely on the “misplaced trust” exception to the Katz 
test to argue that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
 
Judicial Notice with Judge Jessica Brewbaker, PENNLIVE, 
http://www.pennlive.com/living/index.ssf/2013/06/the_judicial_notice_the_law_on.html (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2016) (comparing privacy under Pennsylvania Wiretap Act to Federal 
Wiretap Act).  Some states, including Pennsylvania, also allow for one-party consent to record 
telephone conversations.  See id. 
34.  See Commonwealth v. Diego, 119 A.3d 370, 380–81 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (providing 
court’s analysis of whether police actions constituted interception), appeal denied, 129 A.3d 
1240 (Pa. 2015) (mem.) (unpublished table decision).   
35.  See 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5704(2)(ii)–(iii) (providing exceptions to 
requirement to obtain warrant for interception).  See generally Commonwealth v. Cruttenden, 
58 A.3d 95, 95–96 (Pa. 2012) (holding officer directly engaging in conversation is not 
intercepting for purposes of statute); Proetto, 771 A.2d at 832 (holding no interception 
occurred when police officer interacted directly with defendant in online chat room); see also 
What are Pennsylvania’s wiretapping laws?, supra note 33. 
36.  See generally 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5702 (defining intercept); see also 
Diego, 119 A.3d at 380 (“The definition of ‘intercept’ . . . specifically excludes ‘the 
acquisition of the contents of a communication made through any electronic, mechanical or 
other device or telephone instrument to an investigative or law enforcement officer . . . .”).  
37.  See Karoly v. Mancuso, 65 A.3d 301, 303 (Pa. 2013) (noting that statute prohibits 
interception of private communications “except pursuant to specified procedures”).  In 
Karoly, the court addressed the issue of whether certain conversations made from jail could be 
accessed without violating the Wiretap Act.  See id. at 305.  The court provided that the 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act does “allow county correctional facilities to monitor and record 
inmate phone calls without any specific prior authorization, so long as inmates are notified in 
writing and anyone calling into the facility is also told that his call may be monitored and 
recorded” and these recordings may only be turned over to authorities in order to “safeguard 
the facility.”  See id. at 303-04 (citing 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 5704(14) (2015)).  However, the 
court clarified that attorney-client conversations are not subject to interception in order to 
protect the legal privilege.  See id. at 304. 
38.  See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (describing 
proposition that there is no expectation of privacy when one reveals information to third 
party).  The Supreme Court noted that when one reveals information to a “confidant,” there is 
a chance that person will turn over that information to the government, and the government 
may use that information without violating the Fourth Amendment.  See id.; see also United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (stating that when people reveal bank deposit slips 
to others, they risk that information being shared with government). 
7
Robertson: Don't Press Send: Commonwealth V. Diego Takes Reasonable Expectat
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
18 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE  [Vol. 61: p. 11 
information one relays to others.39  While some commentators have postulated 
that the Supreme Court held that individuals have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in text messages, the government maintains that lower courts still retain 
broad power to determine this issue.40 
Courts exercising broad deferential power to analyze reasonable 
expectation of privacy issues regarding text messages often rely on reasoning 
similar to that of the Supreme Court in United States v. Jacobsen.41  In 
Jacobsen, the defendants were arrested after the employees of “a private freight 
carrier” opened a suspicious package and found a “white powdery substance.”42  
The freight carrier then contacted personnel at the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) who determined that the substance was cocaine, obtained 
a warrant, searched the location of the intended recipient, and arrested the 
defendants.43  The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence, but the 
court of appeals reversed, holding that testing the substance was an improper 
expansion of the original search and a warrant was required.44  In overruling the 
court of appeals, the Supreme Court discussed the idea that when someone 
reveals private information to another person, there is a risk that the information 
will be shared with a third party or law enforcement, and the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the government from using that information.45 
 
39.  See, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117 (noting that when privacy interest has already 
been frustrated, authorities can use information without violating Fourth Amendment); see 
also Vitale, supra note 18, at 1120 (discussing various exceptions to Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement).  The misplaced trust doctrine is similar to the “third-party doctrine” 
enunciated by the Katz court.  See id. 
40.  See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 757 (ruling search of text messages 
reasonable, “even assuming Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy”); see also Vitale, 
supra note 18, at 1110 (“The [Supreme] Court has given wide deference [] to lower courts in 
deciding matters pertaining to cell phone privacy.”).  Vitale argues that the Supreme Court’s 
reluctance in Quon to decide “whether a text message sender had Fourth Amendment 
protections in a context outside of the workplace” indicates the Court may consider 
reexamining this issue and extend the letter analogy to “mobile communication in the twenty-
first century.”  See id. at 1125. 
41.  466 U.S. 109, 125-26 (1984) (holding warrantless “seizure” was reasonable when 
privacy rights had already been infringed “as the result of private conduct”). 
42.  See id at 111–12 (discussing private search of shipped packages).  During 
shipment, the package was damaged.  See id.  When examining the damaged package, the 
freight employees noticed a suspicious substance and notified the DEA.  See id. 
43.  See id. (discussing search and arrest of defendants).  The defendants were indicted 
for possessing an illegal substance with intent to distribute.  See id. 
44.  See id. (examining procedure of case).  The court of appeals held that the DEA 
agent’s warrant depended “on the validity of the agents’ warrantless test of the white powder, 
that the testing constituted a significant expansion of the earlier private search, and that a 
warrant was required.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
45.  See id. at 126 (holding expectation of privacy had “already been frustrated” enough 
to eliminate constitutional protections); see also id. at 115–16 (noting that government action 
may not “change the nature of the search” such that search becomes “additional search subject 
to the warrant requirement” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Supreme Court found 
that the DEA agent’s warrant was valid as the “initial invasions of [the defendants’] package 
were occasioned by private action.”  See id. at 115.  The Court also found that, in order to 
violate the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights, the subsequent testing of the substance by 
the DEA had to “exceed the scope of the private search.”  See id. 
8
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As technology has developed, courts have struggled to determine whether 
an expectation of privacy is reasonable.46  Many courts have compared 
electronic messages to archaic forms of correspondence, such as written 
letters.47  In Guest v. Leis,48 there was an investigation into the use of obscenity 
on an online computer bulletin board.49  While the Sixth Circuit ruled for the 
defendants on other grounds, the court noted that, like a letter, once the message 
had been delivered to its intended recipient, the sender no longer had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in those messages.50 
Many courts have been reluctant to view text messages as distinct and 
 
46.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 149 Fed. App’x 954, 959–60 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(analyzing expectation of privacy in text messages and e-mails as matter of first impression).  
The court cited the subjective and objective prongs from Katz to determine whether a 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists.  Id.  However, the court also pointed out the 
existence of the third party exception.  See id.  The court further likened text messages to e-
mail messages, finding, “[t]he transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable 
expectation that police officials will not intercept the transmission without probable cause and 
a search warrant.  However, once the transmissions are received by another person, the 
transmitter no longer controls its destiny.”  Id. at 959 (quoting United States v. Maxwell, 45 
M.J. 406, 418 (U.S.A.F. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
47.  See id.  (“Those circuits that have addressed the question have compared e-mails 
with letters sent by postal mail.”); see also Vitale, supra note 18, at 1123–24 (discussing 
difficulty with analogizing text messages to letters).  Vitale argues that the letter analogy is 
“insufficient and logically inconsistent.”  See id. (quoting Katharine M. O’Connor, Note, :o 
OMG They Searched My Txts: Unraveling the Search and Seizure of Text Messages, 2010 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 685, 686) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
First, text messages are transmitted in a matter of seconds, while letters are 
delivered in a matter of days.  Consequently, “any reasonable expectation of 
privacy that existed is obliterated just as quickly as the message is delivered.” . . .  
Finally, as technology evolves, courts should consider not only the sophistication of 
the technology but also the way in which people relate to and interact with the 
technology. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  Even though courts have analogized text messages and letters, letter 
senders have some privacies that are not enjoyed by text message senders, such as the law 
making it a federal offense to open a letter addressed to someone else.  See id. at 1124–25. 
48.  255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001). 
49.  See id. at 330-32 (discussing facts of case).  The system in which the obscenities 
were found included “thousands of subscribers from the Greater Cincinnati area, the United 
States and even overseas.”  See id. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Users of the site 
could send e-mails to other subscribers as well as participate in “chat room conversations, on-
line games, and conferences.”  See id.  Officers from the Hamilton County, Ohio, Regional 
Electronic Computer Intelligence Task Force (RECI) often would download obscene images 
and present them to a court in order to obtain a warrant.  See id.  The offenses in question 
included pandering obscenity, which violated an Ohio statute.  See id.  When the officers 
executed the warrant, they were unable to obtain just the obscene images from the computer, 
so they dismantled the computer and removed it from the house.  See id. at 330–31.  One of 
the issues the court decided was whether this action exceeded the scope of the warrant.  See 
id. at 332. 
50.  See id. at 333 (citing United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995)) 
(analogizing e-mailers to letter-writers).  “They would lose a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in an e-mail that had already reached its recipient; at this moment, the e-mailer would be 
analogous to a letter-writer, whose ‘expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon 
delivery’ of the letter.”  Id.  (quoting King, 55 F.3d at 1196). 
9
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continue to analogize them to older means of communication.51  However, in 
State v. Patino,52 the Rhode Island Supreme Court focused specifically on the 
issue of privacy in text messages as an issue of first impression for Rhode 
Island.53  The most common context in which this question arises occurs when 
law enforcement search a suspect’s own cell phone incident to arrest.54  In 
Patino, however, the court reviewed the issue of whether text messages stored 
in another’s phone are subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.55  The 
defendant was indicted for first-degree murder of his girlfriend’s six-year old 
son; the prosecution was mostly premised on incriminating text messages sent 
by the defendant and discovered on his girlfriend’s cell phone.56 
In analyzing whether the evidence obtained should have been suppressed 
for illegal search and seizure, the court looked to approaches taken by other 
jurisdictions to determine whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in text messages stored in another’s phone.57  While the court acknowledged 
 
51.  See State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40, 54 (R.I. 2014) (noting hesitancy to adapt to new 
technology, stating “[i]t is often not easy to pour new wine into old wineskins, yet wise 
stewardship might suggest the use of the old skins until they burst”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
947 (2015) (mem.); see also Jones, 149 Fed. App’x at 959 (noting defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages stored in another’s phone).  The Jones 
court discussed Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz.  See id.  By analogizing text messages to 
letters and e-mails, in which privacy interests erode upon delivery, the court grouped text 
messages with other forms of technology, and accepted those cases as precedent.  See id. 
52.  93 A.3d 40 (R.I. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015) (mem.). 
53.  See id. at 55 (noting issue is of first impression). 
54.  See generally Sara M. Corradi, Comment, Be Reasonable! Limit Warrantless Smart 
Phone Searches to Gant’s Justification for Searches Incident to Arrest, 63 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 943, 944–54 (2013) (examining standard for lawful search of smart phones incident to 
arrest).  The author analyzes lower courts’ analyses of warrantless cellphone searches.  See id. 
at 948–52.  Corradi refers to a Fifth Circuit decision that compared a cell phone to a closed 
container that may be searched incident to arrest.  See id. at 948.  She also discusses a Fourth 
Circuit decision that held that, incident to arrest, text messages may be searched without a 
warrant and recorded in order to preserve the information in United States v. Young.  See id. at 
949. 
55.  See Patino, 93 A.3d at 54–58 (discussing issue in case). 
56.  See id. at 42 (summarizing facts of case).  While investigating the crime scene, the 
police officer searched a cell phone after it received a text message.  See id. at 44–45.  He 
noticed the phone on the counter and one “indicated audibly and by light that it was receiving 
a message.”  Id. at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The police officer picked up the 
phone to see if it was the victim’s father or someone else calling to inquire about the victim’s 
condition.  See id.  Seeing there was a new message, the officer “‘manipulated the button’ on 
the phone, which led to a mailbox listing incoming and outgoing text messages.  [The officer] 
testified that, upon seeing the word ‘hospital’ in a text message,” he opened the folder and 
read a message that referred to the child’s injuries.  Id.  The officer testified that he did not 
read any more messages, but he did relay the information from that message to another 
officer.  See id.  At one point, the officer noticed that a phone was missing, and contacted 
headquarters notifying them that, “[t]here is possibly some information that needs to be 
protected on it . . . .”  See id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Another officer was able to obtain a warrant, which allowed the officers to find further text 
messages that ultimately incriminated the defendant.  See id. at 44–45. 
57.  See id. at 52–53 (discussing how U.S. Supreme Court has determined 
reasonableness for other cases).  The Patino court cited to a Supreme Court concurrence, 
which pointed out that “‘[T]echnology can change those expectations [of privacy].  Dramatic 
technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may 
10
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that advances in technology could lead to different results, its analysis 
ultimately turned on whether the defendant owned or was the primary user of 
the cell phone.58  The court determined that the location of the seized text 
messages is the most important factor in finding an expectation of privacy and 
that the sender loses control over the messages once they are sent.59 
D. Software Update Available: Courts Adjust to New Technology and 
Find Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Text Messages 
In recent years, with the continued emergence of new technology, some 
courts have recognized the need to modify the old rules, particularly regarding 
text messages.60  In City of Ontario v. Quon,61 the United States Supreme Court 
had the opportunity to determine whether text messages stored in another’s 
device were subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, but the Court did not 
 
ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.’”  Id. at 52 (alterations in original) 
(quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)).  Further, 
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “‘[r]apid changes in the dynamics of 
communication and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but 
in what society accepts as proper behavior[.]’”  Id. at 52–53 (alteration in original) (quoting 
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 748 (2010)); see also id. at 55 (noting that courts have 
often compared text messages to other forms of communication, such as personal computers, 
e-mails, address books and laptops). 
58.  See id. at 55.  The Fifth Circuit in Finley held that “the defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in [the defendant’s] cell phone because . . . he ‘maintained a property 
interest in the phone, [and] had a right to exclude others from using the phone[.]’”  Id. (third 
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007)). 
59.  See id. at 55–56 (noting that “idea of control has been central” to court’s 
determinations under Fourth Amendment).  The Patino court also noted that the United States 
Supreme Court considered control as a factor in reviewing the expectation of privacy in an 
item when determining the “distinction ‘between the Fourth Amendment rights of passengers 
and the rights of an individual who has exclusive control of an automobile” in Rakas v. 
Illinois.  See id. at 56 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 154 (1978)).  For other cases 
considering control as a factor, see United States v. Davis, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 
2011) (noting reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of one’s own phone); State v. 
Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1081 (Conn. 2010) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy over 
phone because it would have been reasonable for trial court to conclude defendant “exercised 
exclusive control over it”); State v. Bone, 107 So. 3d 49, 66 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (finding 
reasonable expectation of privacy when one “ha[s] a possessory interest in the phone as the 
exclusive user”). 
60.  See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 178 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A]nalogizing 
computers to other physical objects when applying Fourth Amendment law is not an exact fit 
because computers hold so much personal and sensitive information touching on many private 
aspects of life.”); see also Corradi, supra note 54, at 958–59 (noting that courts have found 
that “computers have a heightened expectation of privacy and require police to obtain a 
specific warrant for the computer prior to searching its contents”); Bryan Andrew Stillwagon, 
Note, Bringing an End to Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 42 GA. L. REV. 1165, 1200–01 
(2008) (arguing that cell phones are comparable to computers).  Stillwagon argues that, 
because cell phones have the ability to contain as much information as a computer, cellphones 
should be classified as computers.  See Stillwagon, supra, at 1201.  The author bases this 
argument on the possibility that “a look into a cell phone’s memory can reveal a subjective 
picture of our life.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
61.  560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
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rule on that issue.62  In Quon, an employee’s government-provided pager was 
searched after he violated the terms of use by sending and receiving too many 
messages.63  While the Supreme Court did not address whether an individual 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages stored on another 
person’s device, the Court determined that the defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in messages sent from his pager.64  In finding for the 
City, the Supreme Court held that although there was an expectation of privacy 
in the text messages, the City’s search was nonetheless reasonable because it 
fell under the “special needs of the workplace” exception.65  Further, in dicta, 
the Court acknowledged that “cell phone and text message communications are 
so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or 
necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification.”66 
In recent years, courts have sought to expand the Fourth Amendment to 
keep pace with changing technology.67  The Supreme Court recently decided 
such an issue in Riley v. California.68  In Riley, police obtained data stored on a 
drive-by shooting suspect’s cell phone without a warrant.69  The defendant 
moved to suppress the evidence against him, and the Supreme Court held that 
the police generally may not search a cell phone seized from an individual upon 
arrest without first obtaining a warrant.70  The Court noted that “[m]odern cell 
phones are not just another technological convenience. . . . [T]hey hold for 
 
62.  See id. at 765 (noting it is not necessary to decide issue in this case). 
63.  See id. at 750–52 (discussing facts of case).  The City of Ontario Police Department 
provided pagers to its employees.  See id. at 750–51.  In using the pagers, the employees had 
to abide by a “Computer Usage, Internet and E–Mail Policy” which gave the City “the right to 
monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use.”  Id. at 751 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  When Quon exceeded his limit multiple times, his superior audited 
his messages and revealed most messages were not related to work.  See id. at 751–53. 
64.  See id. at 760 (assuming Quon had reasonable expectation of privacy in messages 
sent by him on his pager). 
65.  See id. at 760–61 (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (plurality 
opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting “the ‘special needs’ of the workplace” 
trumps unreasonable warrantless searches).  The Court found that “clearly communicated” 
employer policies can “shape” employees’ reasonable expectations.  See id. at 760. 
66.  See id. at 760 (noting that pervasiveness of cell phones may “strengthen” case for 
expectation of privacy); see also Vitale, supra note 18, at 1110 n.3 (noting courts have relied 
on this language to find broad expectation of privacy). 
67.  See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he 
Fourth Amendment must keep pace with the inexorable march of technological progress, or its 
guarantees will wither and perish.”); see also Soma et al., supra note 21, at 526–28 
(discussing legal approaches to privacy issue).  Soma and his co-authors argue that “[t]he right 
to privacy should not be limited to any particular medium or form of expression.”  Id. at 526 
(quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
205–06 (1890)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
68.  134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“These cases require us to decide how the search 
incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones . . . .”). 
69.  See id. at 2480–81 (discussing facts of case).  Incident to arrest, police seized a cell 
phone from the subject and searched its contents, finding photographs and videos that proved 
the defendant was involved in a gang.  See id. 
70.  See id. at 2485 (holding that warrants are required to search “data on cell phones”).  
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many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”71 
The Washington State Supreme Court recently addressed this expansive 
view of cell phone privacy in State v. Hinton.72  In Hinton, a detective arrested a 
man for possession of heroin and seized his cell phone in the process.73  The 
detective then responded to an incoming text message on the man’s cell phone 
and set up a drug deal.74  The detective subsequently arrested the defendant.75  
The court ruled for the defendant and found that the text message conversation 
was private and that the detective was required to obtain a warrant before 
seizing such information.76  Despite no longer having physical control over his 
text messages, the court thought the defendant was still entitled to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the messages he sent.77  The Washington Supreme 
Court recognized the need to respond to the emergence of new technology and 
acknowledged that, while legislatures and courts must strike a balance between 
fighting crime and privacy, ease of communication should not erode privacy 
interests.78 
III. PENNSYLVANIA SUPERIOR COURT REJECTS CALL TO UPDATE 
PRIVACY ISSUES IN COMMONWEALTH V. DIEGO 
In Commonwealth v. Diego, the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to 
consider modern uses of technology in deciding that individuals do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in sending a text message.79  The court read 
the text of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act narrowly and held that no interception 
had occurred.80  In reaching its holding, the court avoided a deeper discussion of 
the expectation of privacy in text messages and the loophole in the 
 
71.  See id. at 2494–95 (citation omitted) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
630 (1886)) (noting that before seizing cell phone police should get warrant).  
72.  319 P.3d 9, 16 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (acknowledging increased use of text 
messages to discuss private matters). 
73.  See id. at 11 (discussing facts of case).  The court analyzed “whether a text 
message conversation was ‘a private affair[]’ protected from a warrantless search” under the 
Washington Constitution.  Id. (alteration in original). 
74.  See id. (discussing facts). 
75.  See id. (discussing facts). 
76.  See id. (noting holding of case).  The Washington Supreme Court looked to the 
state’s historical treatment of phone calls and other electronic communications to determine 
that text messages are subject to an expectation of privacy.  See id. at 14. 
77.  See id. at 14–15 (rejecting notion that control determines whether messages are 
private).  The Washington Supreme Court decided this case based on its state constitution, 
rather than the Fourth Amendment.  See id.  (“Given the realities of modern life, the mere fact 
that an individual shares information with another party and does not control the area from 
which that information is accessed does not place it outside the realm of [the Washington 
Constitution’s] protection.”).  
78.  See id. at 14 (acknowledging that Washington law favors privacy over needs of law 
enforcement); see also Soma et al., supra note 21, at 504 (discussing growing expectation of 
privacy in e-messaging). 
79.  For a thorough discussion of the Diego decision regarding a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, see infra notes 96–112 and accompanying text. 
80.  For a discussion of the superior court’s reasoning regarding the Pennsylvania 
Wiretap Act, see infra notes 113–25 and accompanying text. 
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Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.81 
A. Siri, Please Tell Me the Facts of Commonwealth v. Diego 
After determining that Mr. Gary Still had been involved in a firearms theft, 
Detective James Moyer (the detective) apprehended Still at Still’s father’s 
residence.82  The detective read Still his Miranda rights, and Still soon admitted 
to stealing the firearms, which he later used to trade for heroin.83  After learning 
this, the detective asked Still to set up a heroin deal, and police officers told him 
“it would be in his best interest to do so.”84  Still agreed and explained that he 
would “use the text messaging service on his iPad” to communicate with 
Diego.85  During the transaction, Still texted Diego from his iPad and relayed 
each message to the detectives.86  Still scheduled the transaction to take place at 
a local hotel, and police officers were able to arrest Diego.87 
Following his arrest, Diego filed a motion to suppress the evidence used 
 
81.  For a discussion of the superior court’s rejection of the Appellant’s Brief, see infra 
notes 116–25 and accompanying text. 
82.  See Commonwealth v. Diego, 119 A.3d 370, 372–73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) 
(describing police investigation of Mr. Gary Still), appeal denied, 129 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2015) 
(mem.) (unpublished table decision).  According to the factual summary of the trial court, the 
detective “determined that Mr. Still was involved in the theft of approximately twelve (12) 
firearms from the residence . . . .”  Id. 
83.  See id. (describing Still’s confessions).  Still admitted to stealing numerous guns 
over eight weeks, two of which he exchanged for heroin with Diego.  See id.  Still organized 
the transactions with his iPad, which the police previously confiscated during the firearms 
negotiation.  See id. 
84.  See id. 
85.  See id. 
86.  See id. (describing Still’s transaction with Diego).  Still sat with at least six 
detectives in the basement of the police station and relayed each response from Diego to the 
detectives.  See id.  Detective Moyer testified that an officer was sitting next to Still and “it 
was possible that the officer observed what Mr. Still was doing on the iPad.”  See id. at 372–
73.  The trial court found that: 
“[d]uring the communication, officers were in the room contemporaneously 
observing and directing, but not themselves doing the communicating. . . . The 
officers[’] giving direction to Still, and watching over him, amounts to 
eavesdropping or listening in on the electronic message communication.”  The 
court also noted that “it was [Still] who initiated the phone call at the direction of 
the officers; the clear intent was to intercept.” 
Id. at 381 n.2 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Diego, 
No. 22–CR–0001203–2013 (C.P. Dauphin Mar. 16, 2015)).  While the suppression court 
relied on this information to suppress the evidence obtained, the detective rejected this 
description of the facts: 
We asked Mr. Still if he would be willing to set up a deal with his dealer that 
evening, which he agreed to do.  From that point, he said he usually contacts 
[Appellee] with an i[P]ad through a text messaging service on his i[P]ad.  He was 
provided his i[P]ad.  He then set up the deal.  He asked what he should do.  I said, 
[j]ust do your deal the way you normally would.  He set it up.  He relayed to me 
what was going on.  The deal was set up.  
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Transcript of Proceedings, Suppression Hearing - Vol. 1, 
at 7, Commonwealth v. Diego (C.P. Dauphin Jan. 31, 2014), No. 22–CR–0001203–2013). 
87.  See id. at 373 (describing transaction and Diego’s subsequent arrest). 
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against him.88  At the hearing, “the trial court requested that the parties brief the 
suppression-related issues[,]” and on October 28, 2014, the court granted 
Diego’s suppression motion.89  Consequently, the Commonwealth appealed to 
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.90 
B. Renewing Two-Year Contract: The Superior Court Maintains the 
Status Quo in Its Diego Analysis 
In holding for the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
addressed three separate issues, eventually overturning the trial court opinion 
and finding that the text messages need not be suppressed.91  The court held that 
the appellee’s iPad was not a “device” as defined in the Pennsylvania Wiretap 
Act, that Diego lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text message 
communications, and that the trial court erred in granting Diego’s motion to 
suppress evidence because Diego’s text messages were not “intercepted” in 
violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.92 
1. A New Model: An iPad Is Not a Device 
The court first discussed whether Diego’s iPad fell under the Pennsylvania 
Wiretap Act’s definition of device.93  Under the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, 
using what courts have termed the “telephone exemption,” a police officer may 
use a telephone in the “ordinary course of his duties” to intercept a wire, 
electronic, or oral communication.94  The court held that an iPad was an 
“electronic, mechanical, or other device” and therefore did not fall under the 
telephone exemption of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.95 
 
88.  See id. (explaining Diego’s motion to suppress evidence).  Diego argued that “[t]he 
police supervised and observed the text-message conversation between Still and his drug 
supplier as it was occurring on the iPad.”  See id. at 381 n.2 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Brief for Appellee at 3, Commonwealth v. Diego, 110 A.3d 370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (No. 
1989 MDA 2014) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee], 2015 WL 5666844, at *3). 
89.  See id. at 373 (providing lower court’s holding).   
90.  See id. (referring to Commonwealth’s timely appeal). 
91.  See id. at 373 (indicating three issues to address on appeal and holding of court).  
92.  See id. at 375–76 (describing superior court’s holding). 
93.  See id. at 374 (framing issue). 
94.  See id. (citing 18 PA. STAT. § 5702 (1973)) (discussing telephone exemption under 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act).  The Commonwealth argued that an iPad should fall under the 
telephone exemption to the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.  See id.  The Commonwealth sought to 
rely on this exception by arguing that the iPad “was being used as the functional equivalent of 
a modern cellular phone . . . .”  See id. 
95.  See id. (holding iPad cannot be classified as telephone and therefore cannot be used 
to intercept messages under telephone exemption to Pennsylvania Wiretap Act).  The superior 
court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument and refused to expand the definition of device 
under the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act to include an iPad.  See id.  The court stated that Diego’s 
iPad was not a device under the statute because it was not used to intercept a communication, 
there was no evidence that Diego even used an iPad to communicate with Still, and Still’s 
iPad was the “origin of the intercepted message, and not the device that purportedly 
intercepted that message.” See id.  Further, the court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument 
that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania broadened the telephone exemption in 
Commonwealth v. Spence, 91 A.3d 44 (Pa. 2014).  See id. at 375.  In Spence, a police officer 
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2. What’s Your Password? Court Finds No Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy in Sent Text Messages 
Second, the superior court addressed whether one has “a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of [a] text message conversation . . . .”96  
The court heavily relied on the earlier decision of Commonwealth v. Proetto,97 
which considered the expectation of privacy in chat room conversations.98  In 
Proetto, the court held that one “savvy enough to be using the Internet” should 
be aware that the messages sent could be downloaded and shared, and in 
sending such a message, that person “expressly consents to the recording of the 
message.”99  Relying on Proetto, the Commonwealth argued that Diego “lacked 
a reasonable expectation of privacy” in his text message conversation.100  Diego 
disagreed with this argument and sought to distinguish text messages from chat 
room conversations.101  In his brief, Diego explained that in a chat room 
conversation, neither the sender nor any recipient of the messages can delete the 
message once it is posted.102  He contrasted this by noting that the recipient of a 
 
instructed an informant to make a phone call and turn on the speakerphone to allow the officer 
to listen to the conversation.  See id.  While the defendant argued that the “phone was not a 
phone under the Act with respect to the trooper” because the officer was not a subscriber to 
that specific phone’s service plan, the court rejected this argument and held that the language 
of the statute specifically exempts telephones from the definition of device, and does not 
consider how the telephone is used.  See id. (citing Spence, 91 A.3d at 47).  In the present 
case, the superior court held that an iPad is not a telephone under the “common understanding 
of the relevant terms” and “[t]he fact that an iPad or any other tablet computer can perform 
functions similar or identical to a modern cellular phone is not dispositive . . . .”  See id.  
Finally, the court also held it does not possess the power to broaden the interpretation of the 
term “telephone” under the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.  See id. at 375–76. 
96.  See id. at 376 (stating second issue of case). 
97.  771 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001), appeal granted in part by 790 A.2d 988 (Pa. 
2002) (mem.), and order aff’d by 837 A.2d 1163 (Pa. 2003) (mem.). 
98.  See Diego, 119 A.3d at 376 (quoting Proetto, 771 A.2d at 829) (discussing 
expectation of privacy in e-mail or chat room conversations).   
99.  See id. at 376–77 (citing Proetto, 771 A.2d at 829) (finding lack of expectation of 
privacy in Internet communications).  In Proetto, the court first discussed the expectation of 
privacy in telephone conversations and determined that while a person is engaging in a 
telephone conversation, that person “would have no reason to believe that the other party was 
taping the conversation.”  See id. at 376 (quoting Proetto, 771 A.2d at 829).  It then likened 
sending an e-mail or chat room message to leaving a message on an answering machine.  See 
id. at 376–77 (quoting Proetto, 771 A.2d at 830). 
The sender knows that by the nature of sending the communication a record of the 
communication, including the substance of the communication, is made and can be 
downloaded, printed, saved, or, in some cases, if not deleted by the receiver, will 
remain on the receiver’s system.  Accordingly, by the act of forwarding an e-mail 
or communication via the Internet, the sender expressly consents by conduct to the 
recording of the message. 
Id. (quoting Proetto, 771 A.2d at 830). 
100.  See id. (presenting Commonwealth’s argument). 
101.  See id. at 377 (quoting Brief for Appellee, supra note 88, at 9–10) (arguing that 
text message conversations and chat room conversations are inherently different). 
102.  See id. (asserting that chat room messages are not private because they cannot be 
deleted and once sent, “the proverbial bell cannot be unrung” (quoting Brief for Appellee, 
supra note 88, at 9-10)). 
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text message can delete it, and the recipient of a text message is often a single 
individual.103  Diego argued that these differences were dispositive, that a text 
message should be distinguished from an Internet chat room message, and that 
the Proetto decision should not apply.104  Additionally, Diego relied on the 
Supreme Court’s Riley decision that held police may not search a smart phone 
incident to arrest without obtaining a search warrant.105 
The Diego court rejected Diego’s argument and instead invoked Proetto, 
noting that Proetto applied to both e-mails and chat room posts.106  The court 
compared text messages to e-mails, saying that e-mails and text messages both 
can be deleted by the recipient and both are often sent to only one recipient.107  
The court also held that under the “mutual consent provision” of the 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, Diego should have known that his message was 
being recorded and could be shared.108  The court reasoned that because the 
sender of a text message has knowledge that the message will be recorded, the 
sender loses any reasonable expectation of privacy once that message is sent.109 
Further, the court rejected Diego’s reliance on Riley and found the 
heightened expectation of privacy in text messages was not relevant to the facts 
at bar.110  Unlike in Riley, the police in Diego did not search Diego’s phone 
incident to arrest, so the heightened expectation of privacy was not 
applicable.111  The court concluded its analysis of the expectation of privacy 
issue by comparing text messages to e-mails and first-class mail, holding 
“[w]hen an individual sends a text message, he or she should know that the 
 
103.  See id. (quoting Brief for Appellee, supra note 88, at 9-10) (contrasting chat room 
conversations and text message conversations).  Diego also argued that an Internet chat room 
is “potentially populated by boundless, anonymous individuals,” and therefore chat room 
discussions are inherently different from text messages.  See id. (quoting Brief for Appellee, 
supra note 88, at 9-10). 
104.  See id. (quoting Brief for Appellee, supra note 88, at 9-10) (distinguishing text 
message from chat room post). 
105.  See id. at 377–78 (invoking Supreme Court decision in Riley v. California).  
Diego argued that Riley granted a “heightened expectation of privacy” in cell phone usage.  
See id. at 377. 
106.  See id. (referring to superior court’s inclusion of e-mails in its analysis in 
Proetto). 
107.  See id. (finding that text messages and e-mails are substantially similar). 
108.  See id. (citing Commonwealth v. De Marco, 578 A.2d 942, 948 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1990)) (discussing why “answering machine tapes fall within the mutual consent provision of 
the Wiretap Act”).  The De Marco court held that a “reasonably intelligent person” leaving a 
message on an answering machine “would have to be aware of, and consented by conduct to, 
the recording of the message on the answering machine tape.”  Id. (quoting De Marco, 578 
A.2d at 948). 
109.  See id. (rejecting differences between chat rooms, e-mails, and text messages).  
The court held that the idea of control and the “ability to delete” messages are irrelevant.  See 
id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Rather, “[i]t is the sender’s knowledge that the 
communication will automatically be recorded, surmised from the very nature of the selected 
means of transmission, that is dispositive of the sender’s lack of an expectation of privacy or, 
at least, the lack of any reasonable expectation of privacy.”  Id. (quoting De Marco, 578 A.2d 
at 948). 
110.  See id. at 378 (rejecting Diego’s reliance on Riley).   
111.  See id. (distinguishing facts in Diego from those in Riley). 
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recipient, and not the sender, controls the destiny of the content of that message 
once it is received.”112 
3. Text Delivered: Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act 
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether an “interception” within 
the statutory definition of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act occurred.113  The 
Commonwealth relied on two cases in which the courts determined, because the 
law enforcement officers were direct parties to conversations, no interception 
had occurred.114  Because there was “less police intrusion” in Diego than in 
those two cases, the Commonwealth argued that no interception occurred.115 
The superior court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument because the 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act specifically exempts law enforcement officers who 
communicate directly with a suspected defendant from violating the Act.116  
This did not occur in Diego, as the police officers were communicating with an 
informant, and not directly with Diego, so the holdings from those cases did not 
apply in Diego.117  Additionally, the court rebuked the Commonwealth for not 
providing “support for the proposition that what is or is not an intercept under 
the Wiretap Act turns on the magnitude of the ‘police intrusion.’”118 
The court nonetheless concluded that no interception occurred in the 
case.119  The court found that Still spoke directly with Diego, and “voluntarily” 
 
112.  See id. (equating text message conversations to “first-class mail” (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)).  The Proetto court 
stated that a sender of a letter “can reasonably expect the contents to remain private and free 
from the eyes of the police absent a search warrant founded upon probable cause,” but once 
the intended recipient receives and opens the letter, there is no longer an expectation of 
privacy.  See id. 
113.  See id. at 379 (explaining that evidence may be suppressed for violations of 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act).  In an earlier case, the superior court declared that even if an 
interception does not violate one’s reasonable expectation of privacy, law enforcement can 
still violate the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act by intercepting certain communications.  See id. 
(citing Commonwealth v. Deck, 954 A.2d 603, 608–09 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)).   
114.  See id. at 379–80 (presenting facts of two cases where evidence was not 
suppressed).  The Commonwealth relied on a case where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
held that when a law enforcement officer “communicates directly with a suspect via cell 
phone text messages while pretending to be the suspect’s accomplice[,]” no interception 
occurs.  Id. at 380 (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cruttenden, 58 A.3d 95, 
96 (Pa. 2012)).  Additionally, the Commonwealth relied on Proetto, in which an officer posed 
as an underage female in a chat room and communicated directly with the defendant.  See id. 
(citing Proetto, 771 A.2d at 832). 
115.  See id. at 380 (presenting Commonwealth’s argument that no interception 
occurred). 
116.  See id. (discussing exemption for law enforcement officer communicating directly 
with defendant). 
117.  See id. (rejecting Commonwealth’s reliance on Proetto and Cruttenden).  Because 
no law enforcement officer directly communicated with Diego in setting up a drug transaction, 
the exemption did not apply.  See id. 
118.  See id. (noting that no statute or relevant case law references police intrusion as 
important to decision). 
119.  See id. (holding no interception occurred in violation of Pennsylvania Wiretap 
Act). 
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turned over the text messages to the police.120  The court held that no 
interception occurred because once a message is received, the communication 
has ended, and the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act does not govern any longer.121  
The court found relaying text messages to police after receiving them does not 
“render either his or the police’s conduct an ‘interception’ . . . .”122 
The court concluded its analysis by determining that an interception must 
occur “during the transmission of the message, or at least simultaneous to the 
receipt of the message,” which had not happened in Diego.123  While the court 
acknowledged the situation might have been different had the police read the 
text messages on Still’s iPad as he received them, the court concluded that was 
not the case and thus did not rule on the matter.124  The superior court held the 
trial court erred in suppressing the evidence because there was no constitutional 
violation of Diego’s right to privacy, and the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act did not 
apply to the circumstances.125 
IV. UPGRADE YOUR PLAN: DIEGO DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR A 
CLOSER LOOK AT PRIVACY ISSUES AND LEGISLATION TO PROTECT 
AGAINST INTRUSIVE WIRETAPS 
In Diego, the Pennsylvania Superior Court joined a long list of courts that 
have refused to adapt to new technology and broaden individuals’ expectation 
of privacy.126  Pennsylvania courts have similarly refused to find an expectation 
 
120.  See id. at 380–81 (noting Still, and not police, was party to conversation). 
121.  See id. at 381 (declaring that once message is received, no interception can occur).  
The court decided that, because Still “was a party to the conversation . . . he could not be said 
to have intercepted [the message] simply because he received it.”  Id. at 380–81. 
122.  See id. at 381 (interpreting Pennsylvania Wiretap Act).  The court further opined 
that 
[o]nce an individual text message is received by the intended recipient, the 
communication has ended.  Once the communication had ended, it is simply 
illogical to conclude that subsequent actions constitute intercepts within the 
meaning of the Wiretap Act. . . . It would be absurd to conclude that anytime an 
iPad or similar device records a text message conversation that a Wiretap Act 
violation occurs—for that is the equivalent of saying that everyone receiving a text 
message on such a device has committed a Wiretap Act violation. 
Id. 
123.  See id. (holding no interception occurred). 
124.  See id. at 381–82 (noting that different facts may have led to different opinion).  
The court noted that the record did not support Diego’s “assertion that the police were 
watching Still’s iPad screen over his shoulder as the text messages were sent back and forth to 
Appellee” but noted that if the police had observed the messages, “a different legal question” 
would have to be decided “because it would then be plausible to argue that the police may 
have observed the content of the text messages before Still had received them.”  See id. 
125.  See id. at 382 (reversing suppression order and remanding case). 
126.  See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 126 (1984) (holding when one 
reveals private information to another, that person assumes risks that information may be 
shared with third party); United States v. Jones, 149 Fed. App’x 954, 959–60 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(holding individual sending e-mail loses legitimate expectation of privacy after e-mail is 
received by other party); State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40, 57 (R.I. 2014) (holding sender of text 
messages does not have reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages stored in cellular 
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of privacy in electronic messages.127  Analyzing cases similar to Diego, 
Pennsylvania courts should adopt an approach similar to that taken by the 
Washington State Supreme Court in Hinton.128  Further, Pennsylvania courts 
should broadly interpret the most recent United States Supreme Court decisions 
in Quon and Riley to protect more defendants in cases like Diego and find a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in sent text messages.129  With the emergence 
of new technology and the nearly universal use of texting, one should enjoy a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when sending a text message.130 
Further, legislation may be necessary to address the loophole in the 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, which allowed the law enforcement officers to direct 
an informant to relay text messages from a suspected defendant without first 
obtaining a court-ordered warrant.131  While providing law enforcement with 
the tools to combat crime, the Pennsylvania legislature must uphold the privacy 
rights of citizens of the Commonwealth.132 
 
telephone belonging to recipient of text messages), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015) 
(mem.). 
127.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 832 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (holding 
sender of e-mail or chat room messages has no expectation of privacy upon delivery to 
recipient); Commonwealth v. De Marco, 578 A.2d 942 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding person 
leaving message on answering machine has no expectation of privacy in that message). 
128.  319 P.3d 9, 13 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (holding police detective’s conduct in 
reading text messages and responding invaded defendant’s “private affairs”). 
129.  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (recognizing heightened 
expectation of privacy in text messages); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) 
(noting it was assumed defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in pager messages).  
130.  See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing 
importance of Fourth Amendment keeping pace with technology); see also Soma et al., supra 
note 21, at 525–26 (arguing telephone privacy protections should be extended to e-
messaging).  Soma and his co-authors note that many courts have shown a willingness to find 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in technology.  See Soma et al., supra note 21, at 526 
(describing courts’ feelings toward finding privacy expectation for technology).  They argue, 
“‘[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.’  In today’s world of cyberspace 
communications, people must be identified with the various e-messaging communication 
mechanisms they use.”  Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).  They also argue Congress “intended . . . to extend 
telephone privacy protections to other e-messaging forms, but the lack of clarity and 
exceptions in that statute, along with varying interpretations by the courts, call for a return to 
basic principles.”  See id. (footnote omitted); see also Vitale, supra note 18, at 1137–38 
(discussing why text messages should be subject to expectation of privacy).  Vitale discusses 
the expectation of privacy opined by the Katz doctrine and notes that the Supreme Court 
“appears to have eliminated the subjective component of the Katz test.”  See id. at 1136 
(quoting Christopher R. Jones, “EyePhones”: A Fourth Amendment Inquiry into Mobile Iris 
Scanning, 63 S.C. L. REV. 925, 935 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, 
Vitale looks solely at whether the expectation of privacy over sent text messages is “shared by 
society” and determines that, based on studies, “people consider their cell phones to be at least 
as private of a device as a computer, if not more so.”  See id. at 1136–37. 
131.  See Commonwealth v. Diego, 119 A.3d 370, 381–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (noting 
outcome may have been different if officers observed messages over informant’s shoulder), 
appeal denied, 129 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2015) (mem.) (unpublished table decision); see also 
Nelson, supra note 22 (discussing fact that situation could have been different with “one 
officer glanc[ing] at the iPad screen”).  
132.  See Commonwealth v. Spangler, 809 A.2d 234, 236 (Pa. 2002) (noting Wiretap 
Act emphasizes privacy and provisions are “strictly construed”); see also State v. Hinton, 319 
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A. Pennsylvania Courts Must Issue New Privacy Policy and Disclosure 
Statement Relating to Text Messages 
In analyzing whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in sent text messages, the Pennsylvania Superior Court failed to distinguish text 
messages from other forms of communication.133  Holding that the sender of a 
text message (or chat room message or e-mail) knows the message will 
automatically be recorded fails to take into account the abundance of personal 
information shared via these recorded forms of communication.134 
In recent years, many have noted that it is necessary for future courts to 
address the modern realities of privacy situations and begin to grant a greater 
expectation of privacy.135  Rather than trying to analogize text messages with 
older means of communication for privacy analyses, courts in Pennsylvania 
should address text messages as their own entity.136  To make this shift, courts 
should begin to follow the reasoning of the Washington State Supreme Court in 
Hinton.137  Despite text messages being “more vulnerable to invasion,” the 
privacy interests in them should not vanish.138  Instead, with advances in 
technology and greater surveillance, courts should begin to develop an approach 
 
P.3d 9, 14 (explaining privacy rights overshadow needs of law enforcement in Washington), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015) (mem.). 
133.  See Diego, 119 A.3d at 377 (comparing text messages to e-mails). 
134.  See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 284 (discussing importance of privacy in e-mails).  The 
Warshak court used the second prong of the Katz test to determine whether society would find 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails, noting the importance of the question given the 
wide usage of email.  Id. (“This question is one of grave import and enduring consequence, 
given the prominent role that email has assumed in modern communication. . . .  People are 
now able to send sensitive and intimate information, instantaneously, to friends, family, and 
colleagues half a world away.  Lovers exchange sweet nothings, and businessmen swap 
ambitious plans, all with the click of a mouse button.”). 
135.  See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014) (noting 
technological advances do not make information less private); City of Ontario, v. Quon, 560 
U.S. 746, 760–61 (2010) (discussing that wide-spread use of cell phones may strengthen case 
for privacy); Hinton, 319 P.3d at 15 (stating courts must acknowledge “realities of modern 
life” in addressing privacy issues); see also Vitale, supra note 18, at 1138 & n.210–11 
(pointing to divorce litigation to show that people have expectation of privacy in text 
messages).  Vitale writes that divorce litigation includes many instances where “intimate text 
messages” are at issue.  See id. at 1138 (discussing privacy expectation through divorce 
litigation).  Practitioners have also cited a rise in text messages being used as evidence.  See 
id.  Vitale argues that there is “an expectation [in] society that text messages are a safe mode 
of communication for highly private affairs, even though such messages are often used as 
evidence in litigation.”  Id. 
136.  See Stillwagon, supra note 60, at 1202 (arguing courts should not force “analogies 
between objects just to make their analysis simpler”).  Stillwagon argues that the facts of each 
case should factor into a court’s decision.  See id. (advocating for courts to take facts into 
consideration).  Because cell phones contain “vast amounts of information” courts have to 
address warrantless cell phone searches as different from other searches, such as searching a 
container.  See id. at 1200–01 (discussing wealth of information stored on cell phones). 
137.  See Hinton, 319 P.3d at 16 (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in text 
messages stored on another’s phone).   
138.  See id. at 13 (“Text messages can encompass the same intimate subjects as phone 
calls, sealed letters, and other traditional forms of communication that have historically been 
strongly protected under Washington law.”). 
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that protects privacy interests.139 
This broad approach should follow interpretations of the Supreme Court’s 
Quon and Riley decisions.140  While the Court in Quon did not decide whether 
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a message they 
knowingly send to someone else, lower courts have interpreted the dicta in 
Quon to find an increasingly broad right to privacy in text messages.141  It is a 
natural progression that the expectation of privacy should be expanded to 
encompass text messages sent and stored on another’s phone.142  In Riley, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged the need to expand privacy to cover text 
messages when it said cell phones contain many of the “privacies of life.”143  
Even though people are able to carry this information in their hands, it does not 
make it “any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.”144  
 
139.  See id. (discussing advances in surveillance technology).  The Hinton court noted 
that the state constitutional privacy protections are not analytically constrained or lessened 
because people anticipate lesser levels of protection.  See id. 
140.  See Vitale, supra note 18, at 1110 n.3 (noting lower courts interpreted Quon 
holding to further encompass text messages).  Vitale cites to a Missouri case, which held that 
individuals have an expectation of privacy in text messages, to prove courts have relied on 
Quon to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages.  See id. (citing State v. 
Clampitt, 364 S.W.3d 605, 609–10 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012)). 
141.  See City of Ontario, v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 765 (2010) (“Petitioners and 
respondents disagree whether a sender of a text message can have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a message he knowingly sends to someone’s employer-provided pager.  It is not 
necessary to resolve this question in order to dispose of the case, however.”).  While the Court 
did not address sent text messages (in discussing Quon’s expectation of privacy in his own 
text messages the Court essentially assumed such an expectation existed), lower courts have 
relied on Quon to find a broad expectation of privacy in text messages.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (discussing Quon and noting 
“[a]s the weight of authority agrees that accessing a cell phone’s call log or text message 
folder is considered a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes, it would logically follow that 
an individual also has a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to operational 
functions, such as making calls or exchanging text messages.” (emphasis added)); United 
States v. Davis, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2011) (discussing Quon and finding 
reasonable expectation of privacy in person’s cell phone, including text messages); United 
States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (“Cellular phones contain ‘a 
wealth of private information’ such as recent-call lists, emails, text messages, and 
photographs.  An owner of a cell phone generally has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the electronic data stored on the phone.  Thus, a search warrant is required to search the 
contents of a cell phone unless an exception to the warrant requirement exists.” (citations 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008)). 
142.  See Hinton, 319 P.3d at 13–14 (discussing evolution of privacy issues from 
telegraphs, to phone calls, to electronic communications). 
143.  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014) (quoting Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing importance 
of privacy interests). 
144.  See id. at 2495 (discussing in dicta importance of privacy in United States).  
While discussing the Fourth Amendment and privacy, the Court refers to a 1761 James Otis 
speech opposing the British officers’ “writs of assistance.”  See id. at 2494 (discussing 
reliance on Fourth Amendment by those in opposition to home searches during Colonial Era).  
John Adams, present at the speech, proclaimed “Otis’s speech was ‘the first scene of the first 
act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.  Then and there the child 
Independence was born.’”  See id. (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625); see also Transcript: Read 
the Full Text of the Primetime Republican Debate, supra note 2 (discussing importance of 
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This language demonstrates that much of the foundation of the United States is 
based in the rights of privacy, and Pennsylvania courts should be willing to use 
this language to find a broader expectation of privacy in sent text messages.145 
While there are limited guidelines to follow, courts must attempt to 
adapt.146  If courts continue to ignore and erode our expectations of privacy, 
“the essence of human freedom [will be] severely crippled.”147 
B. Fixed Bug Causing App to Crash: Legislation Would Allow Law 
Enforcement to Fight Crime While Recognizing Important Privacy 
Interests 
To provide texters with an expectation of privacy, the Pennsylvania 
legislature will need to address the loophole in the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act 
that allows police officers to access messages via an informant without first 
obtaining a warrant.148  The Diego court noted there would have been “a 
different legal question” had the police officers “observed the text message 
conversation over Appellee’s shoulder as it occurred . . . .”149  This had not 
 
privacy, candidate Rand Paul said, “The Fourth Amendment was what we fought the 
Revolution over!  John Adams said it was the spark that led to our war for 
independence . . . .”). 
145.  See Stillwagon, supra note 60, at 1206 (arguing cell phones are unique and courts 
should “recognize the nuances of modern cell phone technology”); see also Vitale, supra note 
18, at 1144 (“Despite the continuing evolution of electronic communication, the Court cannot 
ignore that text messaging has come to play a vital role in American society as a prevalent 
way to convey private information.”). 
146.  See Vitale, supra note 18, at 1143–44 (noting future will bring new challenges 
with new forms of communication).  
147.  See Greenwald, supra note 1 (criticizing notion that privacy is not important).  In 
his speech, Greenwald opposes “the idea that only people who are doing something wrong 
have things to hide and therefore reasons to care about privacy . . . .”  See id.  Nevertheless, he 
argues that those in power have “a much narrower conception of . . . ‘doing bad things.’  For 
them, ‘doing bad things’ typically means doing something that poses meaningful challenges to 
the exercise of our own power.”  See id.  Further, he says that failing to challenge constraints 
does not make them “any less potent.”  See id. (claiming that ignoring mass surveillance 
“chains” does not make them weaker).  Finally, he concludes by quoting activist Rosa 
Luxemburg by saying, “He who does not move does not notice his chains.”  See id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
148.  See Nelson, supra note 22 (arguing fine line exists between interception and no 
interception in Diego). 
149.   See Commonwealth v. Diego, 119 A.3d 370, 381–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) 
(discussing whether outcome would be different with different facts), appeal denied, 129 A.3d 
1240 (Pa. 2015) (mem.) (unpublished table decision).  The Diego court found the assertion 
from Diego—that the police officers were observing the text messages as they were sent to 
Still’s phone—was not supported by the facts.  See id. (asserting record does not support 
Appellee’s assertion).  In a footnote, the court provided the testimony of the detective as well 
as the suppression court opinion and Diego’s brief and said that the suppression court never 
definitively found that the officers observed the messages.  See id. at 381 n.2.  “Detective 
Moyer testified that Officer Corey Dickerson was sitting next to Mr. Still during the 
communications and said that it was possible that the officer observed what Mr. Still was 
doing on the iPad.”  Id. (quoting Transcript of Proceedings, Suppression Hearing - Vol. 3, at 
1–2, Commonwealth v. Diego (C.P. Dauphin Mar. 16, 2015), No. 22–CR–0001203–2013 
[hereinafter Transcript of Suppression Hearing]).  The superior court, in dismissing this 
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occurred, so no interception occurred in violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretap 
Act.150 
The fact that the actions taken by police did not constitute an interception 
reveals a major flaw in the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.151  The court was correct 
in dismissing the Commonwealth’s reliance on Proetto and Cruttenden and 
arguing the amount of “police intrusion” determined whether an interception 
occurred.152  However, by relying on the Commonwealth’s assertion that Still 
“voluntarily” turned over the text messages ignores that law enforcement often 
coerce informants into turning over messages under the threat of arrest.153  
When the police apprehended Still, Still was asked to set up a drug deal with 
Diego, and the police told Still “it would be in his best interest to do so.”154  
Still had no choice but to comply with the officers’ demands.155 
Other courts addressing similar issues have held it should almost always be 
a requirement for law enforcement to obtain a warrant to search someone’s 
information.156  While the Diego court found that the police did not intercept 
 
possibility, stated, “The mere possibility that Officer Dickerson had contemporaneously 
observed the conversation between Appellee and Still on Still’s iPad does not demonstrate 
that he did observe it.  It merely expresses Detective[] Moyer’s uncertainty about what Officer 
Dickerson observed.”  Id. 
150.  See id. at 380 (holding no interception occurred).  Because Still, and not the 
police, spoke with Diego, the communication ended as soon as Still received the text message, 
and therefore the police could not have intercepted it.  See id. at 380–81. 
151.  See id. (discussing that no interception occurred because Still relayed text 
messages to police).   
152.  See id. (rejecting Commonwealth’s argument).  “The definition of ‘intercept’ in 
Section 5702 specifically excludes ‘the acquisition of the contents of a communication . . . 
between a person and an investigative or law enforcement officer, where the investigative or 
law enforcement officer poses as an actual person who is the intended recipient of the 
communication[.]’”  Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
5702).  Based off this language, the court found that the exception to the definition of 
intercept in the statute did not apply; nonetheless, the court held no interception occurred at 
all.  See id. 
153.  See id. (noting Still “voluntarily” relayed text messages to police).  The court 
found that Still spoke directly with the appellee by text message.  See id.  Further, the court 
found that this conversation was voluntary.  See id.  Because Still was the one speaking with 
Diego, “he could not be said to have intercepted it simply because he received it.  That he 
subsequently relayed the contents of that conversation to the police does not render either his 
or the police’s conduct an ‘interception’ under the plain meaning of the Act.”  See id. at 380–
81; see also Richard Q. Hark, Your IPAD and Text Communications . . . No Expectation of 
Privacy . . . Sanctioned Police Conduct, HARK & HARK (July 23, 2015), 
https://penncriminaldefense.wordpress.com/2015/07/23/your-ipad-and-text-communications-
no-expectation-of-privacy-sanctioned-police-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/9QCY-NLEG] 
(criticizing result in Diego and noting police likely observed text messages). 
154.  See Diego, 119 A.3d at 372 (citing Transcript of Suppression Hearing, supra note 
150, at 1–2) (explaining officers’ request that Still set up heroin deal with Diego). 
155.  See Your IPAD and Text Communications, supra note 153 (criticizing holding in 
Diego).  The author argues that “police participate in [criminal informant] real-time texting all 
the time. . . . The [Diego] court ignored reality.”  See id. (arguing that police should have been 
required to secured warrant). 
156.  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (“Our answer to the 
question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is 
accordingly simple—get a warrant.”); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 
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Diego’s text messages, the police officers’ actions should be classified as an 
interception and reviewed under the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.157  Although it 
is important for law enforcement to maintain the ability to fight crime, privacy 
issues cannot be ignored; therefore, the Pennsylvania legislature should enact an 
amendment requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant before enlisting an 
informant to relay text messages.158 
V. CONCLUSION 
As more and more courts find an increasingly broad expectation of privacy 
in text messages, it is natural to assume a greater expectation of privacy in sent 
text messages stored on another’s phone.159  The Supreme Court has noted that 
it is important to recognize the privacy rights in new forms of technology.160  As 
text messages contain the “privacies of life,” they should be afforded a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from unwarranted government intrusion.161  
The Pennsylvania Wiretap Act needs to be amended to limit the ability of law 
 
(6th Cir. 2010) (“The government may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents 
of a subscriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.”); State v. 
Hinton, 319 P.3d 9, 16 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (“Law enforcement is certainly permitted to 
use some deception, but ‘[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect 
liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. . . .  The greatest dangers to liberty 
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.’”)  
(alterations in original) (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 947 (2015) (mem.). 
157.  See Nelson, supra note 22 (arguing Diego allows for easier warrantless searches).  
Nelson writes, “For now, perhaps, the answer is, ‘don’t text with an informant,’ but this shifts 
the focus to citizens to remain vigilant from government overreaching, rather than on the 
government to uphold its obligations.”  Id. 
158.  See Stillwagon, supra note 60, at 1205–06 (discussing purpose of Fourth 
Amendment).  However, the Fourth Amendment allows law enforcement officers to use 
evidence.  See id. (explaining use of evidence under Fourth Amendment).  It just ensures that 
a “neutral and detached magistrate” will make inferences about possible evidence, allowing 
the law enforcement officer to legally fight crime.  See id. at 1205–06 (quoting Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948)). 
159.  See Vitale, supra note 18, at 1144 (arguing new forms of electronic 
communication will continue to develop).  Vitale argues for a “uniform body of law 
surrounding text messages” that will enable courts in the future to address text message 
privacy without having to rely on tenuous analogies.  See id. (emphasizing need for uniformity 
in law concerning text messages and privacy). 
160.  See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 
(2001)) (discussing necessity of Fourth Amendment keeping pace with technology). 
161.  See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 (“Modern cell phones are not just another 
technological convenience.  With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many 
Americans ‘the privacies of life.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 630 (1886)).  The Court writes that because the Fourth Amendment is one of the 
founding principles of the United States, it should only be circumvented by the use of 
warrantless searches in limited “exigent circumstances.”  See id. at 2494.  Examples of this 
would include “a suspect texting an accomplice who, it is feared, is preparing to detonate a 
bomb, or a child abductor who may have information about the child’s location on his cell 
phone.”  See id.  Nevertheless, because the Fourth Amendment is one of the founding 
principles of the United States, it should only be circumvented in these rare situations.  See id. 
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enforcement to infringe on this right to privacy.162  Until the Pennsylvania 
courts acknowledge a right to privacy in sent text messages and until the 
legislature amends the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, residents of the 






162.  See Commonwealth v. Diego, 119 A.3d 370, 381–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) 
(stating outcome of case may have been different with slightly different facts), appeal denied, 
129 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2015) (mem.) (unpublished table decision); see also Nelson, supra note 
22 (arguing unclear law may lead to government overreach). 
163.  See Nelson, supra note 22 (warning not to text with informant). 
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